The question of the rationality of social interaction

Karl-Otto Apel

pp. 9-29

in: Kah-Kyung Cho (ed), Philosophy and science in phenomenological perspective, Berlin, Springer, 1984

Abstrakt

The topic of my paper could have its place in the context of analytical theory of action. But within the framework of a post-behavioristic approach, this type of action-theory seems to converge broadly with that of a phenomenology of action. Viewed this way, the question under discussion could hold a twofold cognitive interest. Relating the concept of action to the concept of rationality may, on the one hand, serve to explicate the concept of action (for example, in the sense of a typology of actions according to the criteria of their specific rationality or degree of rationalization). On the other hand, using the concept of rationality or rationalization in order to characterize types of action provides a method of explicating the concept of rationality or reason (for example, in the sense of a distinction between different concepts or types of rationality).¹