Perception and "action"

on the praxial structure of intentional consciousness

pp. 105-137

in: Panos Theodorou, Husserl and Heidegger on reduction, primordiality, and the categorial, Berlin, Springer, 2015

Abstrakt

At some point of his career, Husserl started adopting a new terminology to refer to what were previously known as "intentional acts" or "intentional living experiences." He now speaks about "intentional practices" in general. Every unfolding of consciousness' intentional possibilities may now be understood as some kind of "Praxis." Even the intentionality characterizing simple perceptual consciousness is now seen as a practice, a perceptual practice (Wahrnehmungspraxis). The intentionality of the acts of predicative thematization is now seen as another kind of practice (Handeln). The special acts of consciousness by means of which we do theoretical and scientific work are also collectively called "theoretical praxis" (theoretische Praxis). The question is: what does this mean and what does this change signify? It is only recently that some sporadic interest in this aspect of Husserlian scholarship has begun to arise.