The mind as neural software?

understanding functionalism, computationalism, and computational functionalism

Gualtiero Piccinini

269-311

Voluntary belief on a reasonable basis

Philip J. Nickel

312-334

Things that make things reasonable

John Gibbons

335-361

Mechanisms, causes, and the layered model of the world

Stuart Glennan

362-381

Kant and the claims of the poor

Pablo Gilabert

382-418

The reflective epistemic renegade

Bryan Frances

419-463

Coordination problems

Scott Soames

464-474

Comments on Scott Soames' 'coordination problems'

Kit Fine

475-484

Varieties of coreference

Krista Lawlor

485-495

Reply to Lawlor's 'varieties of coreference'

Kit Fine

496-501

Semantics as information about semantic values

Paul Hovda

502-510

Comments on Paul Hovda's "semantics as information about semantics values"

Kit Fine

511-518

Review of J. C. Beall and Greg Restall, Logical pluralism

J. A. Burgess

519-522