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Publication details
Year: 2011
Pages: 63-77
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability", Synthese 181 (1), 2011, pp. 63-77.
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Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability
pp. 63-77
in: Gürol Irzik, Elliott Sober (eds), Hans Reichenbach, Istanbul, and experience and prediction, Synthese 181 (1), 2011.Abstract
I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost.
Cited authors
Publication details
Year: 2011
Pages: 63-77
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability", Synthese 181 (1), 2011, pp. 63-77.