Intentional reference as a logical relation

a variation on a theme in Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Bergmann

Herbert Hochberg

pp. 137-170

in: Rosaria Egidi (ed), Wittgenstein, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstrakt

Obviously this expression ‘referring to’ stands for some relation which each true belief has to one fact and to one only; and which each false belief has to no fact at all; and the difficulty was to define this relation.... and we may know both that there is such a relation, and that this relation is essential to the definition of truth. And what I want to point out is that we do in this sense know this relation.... Take any belief you like; it is, I think, quite plain that there is just one fact, and only one,... which would have no being — would simply not be, if the belief were false. And as soon as we know what the belief is, we know just as well and as certainly what the fact is which in this sense corresponds with it.1

Cited authors

Russell Bertrand

Wittgenstein Ludwig

Moore George Edward