Demystifying Roman Ingarden's purely intentional objects of perception

Genki Uemura

Okayama University

pp. 139-162

in: Nicolas de Warren, Shigeru Taguchi (eds), New phenomenological studies in Japan, Berlin, Springer, 2019

Abstrakt

The aim of the present paper is to eliminate a seeming redundancy in Roman Ingarden's theory of perceptual intentionality and, through this, provide a modest and partial defense of his theory. I shall first argue that, contrary to an impression one might initially have, Ingarden's notion of purely intentional objects of perception is not superfluous; purely intentional objects of perception play a role as representational contents. Second, I shall point out that Ingarden's theory has some merits that prove it to be worthy of serious and closer consideration for us today.

Cited authors

Ingarden Roman Witold