Underdetermination as a path to structural realism

Katherine Brading

Alexander Skiles

pp. 99-115

in: Elaine Landry, Dean P. Rickles (eds), Structural realism, Berlin, Springer, 2012

Abstrakt

We examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged "metaphysical underdetermination" afflicting contemporary fundamental physics. Current discussions have focussed on challenging this underdetermination claim. Our purpose here is to examine what follows even if the premise concerning underdetermination is conceded. We consider the additional premises needed to arrive at an endorsement of ontic structural realism, and show that each can and should be rejected. Moreover, the ontic structural realist program faces an analogous metaphysical underdetermination issue of its own. We conclude that the argument fails, independently of whether the alleged metaphysical underdetermination is conceded.