A strategic perspective on if games
pp. 101-116
in: Ondrej Majer, Pietarinen, Tero Tulenheimo (eds), Games, Berlin, Springer, 2009Abstract
Hintikka and Sandu's Independence-friendly logic (Hintikka, 1996; Hintikka and Sandu, 1997) has traditionally been associated with extensive games of imperfect information. In this paper we set up a strategic framework for the evaluation of IF logic à la Hintikka and Sandu. We show that the traditional semantic interpretation of IF logic can be characterized in terms of Nash equilibria. We note that moving to the strategic framework we get rid of IF semantic games that violate the principle of perfect recall. We explore the strategic framework by replacing the notion of Nash equilibrium by other solution concepts, that are inspired by weakly dominant strategies and iterated removal thereof, charting the expressive power of IF logic under the resulting semantics.