Publication details
Verlag: Springer
Ort: Berlin
Jahr: 2007
Pages: 197-208
Reihe: Axiomathes
Volle Referenz:
, "Spurning charity", Axiomathes 17 (2), 2007, pp. 197-208.
Abstrakt
The principle of charity ("Charity"), in one form or other, is held by many and for various reasons. After cataloging discernible kinds of Charity, I focus on the most familiar versions as found in Davidson, Dennett, Devitt, Lewis, Putnam, Quine, Stich, and others. To begin with, I argue that such versions of Charity are untenable because beliefs cannot be counted, and even if they could be counted there is reason to believe that true beliefs need not outnumber false beliefs. Next I rebut one of the arguments behind Charity, the intelligibility argument. If indeed beliefs are postulated simply as a way to make some system intelligible (predictable and explicable) then a number of theses ensue. First, it would be perfectly intelligible to ascribe mostly false beliefs to an intentional system, or even entirely false beliefs. Second, lower animals would have beliefs. Third, it would sometimes make sense to ascribe beliefs even to inanimate beings. And fourth, the resulting indeterminacy of belief-ascription would suggest a kind of irrealism about belief which may in turn be expressed by the slogan that rejects the container metaphor of the mind.
Cited authors
Publication details
Verlag: Springer
Ort: Berlin
Jahr: 2007
Pages: 197-208
Reihe: Axiomathes
Volle Referenz:
, "Spurning charity", Axiomathes 17 (2), 2007, pp. 197-208.