Reference, experience, and intentionality
pp. 185-209
in: Leila Haaparanta (ed), Mind, meaning and mathematics, Berlin, Springer, 1994Abstrakt
The insight, due originally to Dagfinn Føllesdal, that some of Husserl's most characteristic problems, concepts, and doctrines could be elucidated by comparing them with those of Frege was in many ways a liberation.1 Amongst other things, it provided an initial point of access to Husserl's thoughts and texts, in the absence of which Husserl might well have continued to seem, to those of a generally "analytic' orientation, either too impenetrable or too irrelevant to warrant investigation. It provided a touchstone against which certain Husserlian doctrines could be evaluated. Likewise — though this aspect has so far been little emphasized — it provided a perspective within which a balanced and critical judgement of Frege's achievements could be formulated.2 And finally, F0llesdaFs insight has provoked and fostered a healthy curiosity about European intellectual history, and especially about the nature and origin of the socalled "analytic-continental' divide that characterizes so much contemporary European thought. The invitation to compare the ideas of Husserl and Frege has clearly proved immensely valuable.
