Is there a phenomenology of unconsciousness?

being, nature, otherness in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas

Dorothée Legrand

pp. 95-111

in: Dorothée Legrand, Dylan Trigg (eds), Unconsciousness between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, Berlin, Springer, 2017

Abstrakt

Is there a phenomenology of unconsciousness? How does posing this question impact both the very conception of phenomenology as a philosophical enterprise and of unconsciousness as a concept participating to the very definition of psychoanalysis? What is unconsciousness, if it can be thought of, not only in psychoanalysis, but also in phenomenology? What is phenomenology, if there can be a phenomenology of unconsciousness? The multifaceted determinations which Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas give to unconsciousness summon notions as crucial as consciousness, subjectivity, humanity, nature, being, and go down to redefining the very concepts of phenomenon and logos without which there could be no phenomeno-logy. Placing the notion of unconsciousness within the scope of phenomenology allows considering not only conscious but also unconscious subjectivity, and allows characterizing both asubjective and subjective modes of being unconscious. Considering this framework will help understanding the scope of the question: is there a phenomenology of unconsciousness? Yes, the investigation of unconsciousness participates to the very definition of phenomenology; No, phenomenological conceptions of unconsciousness do not leave intact the defining limits of phenomenology, but pushes them further by the mobilization of a surplus it intrinsically contains and that is revealed in its investigation of unconsciousness: ontology and ethics .

Cited authors

Merleau-Ponty Maurice

Heidegger Martin

Levinas Emmanuel