Physical theory and experiment

Pierre Duhem

1-40

Two dogmas of empiricism

Willard Quine

41-64

Empiricist criteria of cognitive significance

problems and changes

Carl G. Hempel

65-85

Postscript (1964) on cognitive significance

Sandra Harding

86-88

Some fundamental problems in the logic of scientific discovery

Karl Popper

89-112

Background knowledge and scientific growth

Karl Popper

113-115

The duhemian argument

Adolf Grünbaum

116-131

A comment on Grünbaum's claim

Willard Quine

132-132

Scientific revolutions as changes of world view

Thomas S. Kuhn

133-154

Grünbaum on the "duhemian argument"

Laurens Laudan

155-161

Quine, Grünbaum, and the duhemian thesis

Carlo Giannoni

162-175

Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on falsification

Gary Wedeking

176-183

Duhem, Quine and a new empiricism

Mary Hesse

184-204

Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes

Imre Lakatos

205-259

Is it never possible to falsify a hypothesis irrevocably?

Adolf Grünbaum

260-288

The rationality of science

Paul Feyerabend

289-315