Introduction

Richard S. BROWN

1-10

An epistemology for phenomenology?

Ruth Garrett Millikan

13-26

From phenomenology to the self-measurement methodology of first-person data

Gualtiero Piccinini, Corey Maley

27-32

Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"

Paul M. Churchland

35-56

Churchland on arguments against physicalism

Torin Alter

57-67

Response to Torin Alter

Paul M. Churchland

69-71

Orthodox property dualism+the linguistic theory of vagueness=panpsychism

Philip Goff

75-91

A wake up call

William S. Robinson

93-101

What is acquaintance with consciousness?

Jonathan Simon

103-118

Reply to Simon and Robinson

Philip Goff

119-123

It's still there!

Benj Hellie

127-136

Perceptual justification outside of consciousness

Jacob Berger

137-145

Some thoughts about hallucination, self-representation, and "there it is"

Jeff Speaks

147-154

But where is a hallucinator's perceptual justification?

Heather Logue

155-161

Yep—still there

Benj Hellie

163-169

Black and white and colour

Kathleen A. Akins

173-223

What is visual and phenomenal but concerns neither hue nor shade?

Pete Mandik

225-233

The real trouble with phenomenal externalism

new empirical evidence for a brain-based theory of consciousness

Adam Pautz

237-298

No problem

David Hilbert, Colin Klein

299-306

Ignoring the real problems for phenomenal externalism

a reply to Hilbert and klein

Adam Pautz

307-317

What we hear

Jason Leddington

321-334

Commentary on Leddington

Matt Nudds

343-348

Making sense of multiple senses

Kevin Connolly

351-364

Explaining multisensory experience

Matthew Fulkerson

365-373

Seeing as a non-experiental mental state

the case from synesthesia and visual imagery

Berit Brogaard

377-394

Synesthesia

an experience of the third kind?

Ophelia Deroy

395-407

Varieties of synesthetic experience

Berit Brogaard

409-412

Not a hot dream

Miguel A. Sebastian

415-432

Sweet dreams are made of this?

a hot response to Sebastián

Josh Weisberg

433-443

The DLPFC is not a NCHOT

a reply to Sebastián

Matthew Ivanowich

445-449

I cannot tell you (everything) about my dreams

reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg

Miguel A. Sebastian

451-457