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Publication details

Jahr: 2009

Pages: 275-287

Reihe: Synthese

Volle Referenz:

Gabriel Segal, "Keep making sense", Synthese 170 (2), 2009, pp. 275-287.

Abstrakt

In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.

Cited authors

Publication details

Jahr: 2009

Pages: 275-287

Reihe: Synthese

Volle Referenz:

Gabriel Segal, "Keep making sense", Synthese 170 (2), 2009, pp. 275-287.