On Stackelberg mixed strategies

Vincent Conitzer

pp. 689-703

in: Thomas Ågotnes, Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek (eds), Logic and the foundations of game and decision theory, Synthese 193 (3), 2016.

Abstrakt

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I argue that, even though a Stackelberg mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there remains significant value in studying it separately. The analysis of this special case may have implications for other solution concepts.