A sensitive virtue epistemology

Anthony Bolos

James H. Collin

pp. 1321-1335

in: Joseph Ulatowski, Cory Wright (eds), Minimalism about truth, Synthese 195 (3), 2018.

Abstrakt

We offer an alternative to two influential accounts of virtue epistemology: Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE). We argue that while traditional RVE does offer an explanation of the distinctive value of knowledge, it is unable to effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck; and while ALVE does effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck, it lacks RVE’s resources to account for the distinctive value of knowledge. The account we provide, however, is both robustly virtue-theoretic and anti-luck, having the respective benefits of both rival accounts without their respective shortcomings. We describe this view here.