Moral judgement

pp. 83-109

in: Benedict Smith, Particularism and the space of moral reasons, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011

Abstract

On the face of it, moral perception looks to be a more troubling idea than moral judgement. Talking of moral judgement is not already philosophically problematic in a way that moral perception seems to be, since, for example, it does not immediately imply a controversial metaphysics. Although philosophers disagree about what they regard as the nature of moral judgement and how best to characterize it, the idea of moral judgement as such is, apparently, uncontroversial. Moral judgement can, following Garrett Cullity's suggestion, refer to (at least) four things (Cullity, 1998). First, a certain kind of deliberative activity; second, a psychological state that can result from the activity; third, a content not an activity: that a is F; fourth, as a virtue: one aspires to have moral judgement (judgement is intrinsically valuable). In the case of particularism, the appeal to moral judgement refers to our capacity for rational thought that is interdependent with forms of empirical awareness. To repeat: "it is our capacity to judge which is at issue", as Dancy says (Dancy, 2004, p.144). In emphasizing our capacity to judge in this context, Dancy draws attention to our ability to discern moral reasons by operating at a level which may require, but cannot be explicated solely in terms of, ordinary empirical awareness. Furthermore, judgement is an activity which enables discernment of (moral) reasons for which there is no method and through which we can enjoy moral knowledge.