Minimalism about truth

Special issue introduction

Joseph Ulatowski, Cory Wright

927-933

Constituting assertion

a pragmatist critique of Horwich's "truth"

Andrew W. Howat

935-954

Can minimalism about truth embrace polysemy?

Katarzyna Kijania-Placek

955-985

Truth, explanation, minimalism

Cory Wright

987-1009

Three questions for minimalism

Keith Simmons

1011-1034

This is not an instance of (e)

Teresa Marques

1035-1063

Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth

Anil Gupta, Shawn Standefer

1065-1075

Minimalism and the generalisation problem

on Horwich's second solution

Cezary Cieśliński

1077-1101

The value of minimalist truth

Filippo Ferrari

1103-1125

Is truth a normative concept?

Paul Horwich

1127-1138

Doxastic desire and attitudinal monism

Douglas Campbell

1139-1161

Belief isn't voluntary, but commitment is

Nicholas Tebben

1163-1179

The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability

Nicholas DiBella

1181-1210

Transitivity and proportionality in causation

Neil Mcdonnell

1211-1229

On constructing a logic for the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding

Francesca Poggiolesi

1231-1254

Is it appropriate to "target" inappropriate dissent?

on the normative consequences of climate skepticism

Anna Leuschner

1255-1271

Voting, deliberation and truth

Stephan Hartmann, Soroush Rad

1273-1293

On the proper construal of the manifest-scientific image distinction

Brandom contra Sellars

Dionysis Christias

1295-1320

A sensitive virtue epistemology

Anthony Bolos, James H. Collin

1321-1335

Transitivity, self-explanation, and the explanatory circularity argument against humean accounts of natural law

Marc Lange

1337-1353