Scientific realism

an elaboration and a defence

Howard Sankey

pp. 55-79

in: Martin Carrier, Johannes Roggenhofer, Günter Küppers, Philippe Blanchard (eds), Knowledge and the world, Berlin, Springer, 2004

Abstract

This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysics of common sense. Further, the success of science entitles us to infer both the approximate truth of mature scientific theories and the truth-conduciveness of the methods of science.