Scientific method without metaphysical presuppositions

pp. 95-106

in: Herbert Feigl, Inquiries and provocations, Berlin, Springer, 1981

Abstract

As the title of this article indicates, I contend that there are no philosophical postulates of science, i.e., that the scientific method can be explicated and justified without metaphysical presuppositions about the order or structure of nature. My positivistic or logical empiricist background, I must admit, may have made me somewhat allergic to the term "metaphysics." I realize full well that there are uses of this word that cover quite respectable or at least semi-respectable endeavors. If "metaphysics' designates the examination and explication of the basic concepts, methods, and assumptions of the quest for knowledge, then, surely, logical empiricists are metaphysicians — only they prefer to label this sort of study "Logical Analysis", "Theory of Knowledge", or "Philosophy of Science." The term "metaphysics' is sometimes used also for the highly extrapolative — and in this sense precariously speculative — pursuits of the synthesis of a well-rounded world view. "Inductive Metaphysics' is perhaps a good label for this type of endeavor. But metaphysics in this sense is continuous with science. It is merely the most venturesome part of scientific theorizing. Modern cosmological theories in physics and astronomy furnish a good example of this sort of speculation. Generally, it seems scientists are much more competent than professional philosophers to judge to what extent, if any, hypotheses of this more sweeping sort are warranted by the empirical evidence on hand.