Causation, fictionalism and non-cognitivism

Berkeley and Hume

P. E. Kail

pp. 31-40

in: Silvia Parigi (ed), George Berkeley, Berlin, Springer, 2011

Abstract

"Non-cognitivism", a creature of the twentieth century, is nevertheless associated with David Hume and George Berkeley, two figures of the eighteenth, often in relation to their ethical theories. I am not here concerned with the history of this association, nor with the application (or misapplication) of "non-cognitivism" to Hume's or Berkeley's views on ethical thought and talk. Instead I want to compare their treatments of the causal relation, and probe the extent to which each can be understood as offering, albeit in embryonic form, a non-cognitivist account of it. The purpose of this exercise, however, is not taxonomic. It is questionable whether such an exercise would be of much weight or interest, even if we were to ignore the obvious problem of anachronism. For the identity of "non-cognitivism" is itself contested in contemporary philosophy, and so there is, in fact, no settled way to determine what exactly is "non-cognitivism". Because any definition of "non-cognivism" would, of necessity, foreclose on a host of difficult matters I shall not offer any such definition. I shall instead examine the accounts of Hume and Berkeley with an eye to what kinds of considerations might invite the label "non-cognitivism" and in what senses that label might be appropriate.

Cited authors

Hume David

Berkeley George