A metabletic-philosophical evaluation of mental health

Jan H. van den Berg

pp. 121-135

in: Tristram Engelhardt, Stuart Spicker (eds), Mental health: philosophical perspectives, Berlin, Springer, 1978

Abstract

Seemingly the definition of "mental health" presents few difficulties. According to a widespread general conception, human existence is a physical as well as a psychological existence, based on the equally well-known division of human existence into body and soul. The body is that part of us which is visible. It is the physician who concerns himself with the health of the body. If the organs of the body are in good condition, which as a rule can be deduced from the usually clear results of scientifically oriented examinations, then a state of physical health appears to be achieved. The soul is said to be that "thing in us' which is nonvisible, which is immaterial. The soul contains all that which is left of us when we remove in thought — the purely physical elements from our existence. What remains is, for instance, our interests, our longings, our happiness, our sorrow. Our life! Perhaps our destiny. To the domain of our soul belong likewise all the ties we have with others. All these aspects I have just mentioned form together that which is nonphysical in the medical sense. It must be noted, however, that the psychic functions here indicated and many others which could be added to this list cannot do without the human body. What is our sorrow if it cannot express itself through our body? What are relationships between people if those people are not physical? But let me stop worrying about this just now, at the very beginning of my paper. Body and soul — it is a wellknown and generally accepted distinction. Equally accepted is the distinction between physical and mental health. Today I wish to talk about mental health and not about the functioning of physical organs.