Knowledge, time, and paradox

introducing sequential epistemic logic

Wesley H. Holliday

pp. 363-394

in: Hans van Ditmarsch, Paul-Gabriel Sandu (eds), Jaakko Hintikka on knowledge and game-theoretical semantics, Berlin, Springer, 2018

Abstract

Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic "paradoxes", such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch's Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the "anti-performatory effect" of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation on basic dynamic epistemic logic—what we call sequential epistemic logic—and argue that it allows more faithful and fine-grained analyses of those epistemological topics.