The moral order of modern societies, moral communication and indirect moralizing

Thomas Luckmann

pp. 11-24

in: Michael Wicke (ed), Konfigurationen lebensweltlicher Strukturphänomene, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1997

Abstract

It may be useful to begin with a brief clarification of the main terms I use in my observations on morality in modern societies. I view morality as a reasonably coherent set of notions of what is right and what is wrong — beyond the pulls and pushes of any momentary situation and above the immediate gratification of desires. The notions, held by individuals, are not of subjective origin; they are intersubjectively constructed, socially selected, maintained and transmitted. Thus they form historical traditions of distinct conceptions of the good life. "Reasonably coherent" does not imply that they are necessarily integrated into a tight system. The degree to which the moral view of life is dogmatically articulated depends upon the presence of moral entrepreneur experts in the society; it also depends on the kind of experts involved in systematization: prophets, theologians, philosophers, educationists etc.