The pitfall of hypostatization and the reality of social things

Fred Eidlin

Barry Eidlin

pp. 417-427

in: Nimrod Bar Am, Stefano Gattei (eds), Encouraging openness, Berlin, Springer, 2017

Abstract

Abstractions and hypothetical constructs are a necessary part of scientific inquiry, our collective effort to understand the social and natural world. The problem of hypostatization occurs when we confuse these abstractions and hypothetical constructs used to probe reality with reality itself. However, the attempt to avoid hypostatization by denying existence to social things can end up encouraging a tendency to hypostatize the constructs social science imposes on social reality. This paper advances a remedial approach to the problem of hypostatization. It advocates a practical ontology of the social, and attention to formulating falsifiable hypotheses. Lack of such a practical ontology of social reality encourages a seductive psychological disposition to hypostatize. It makes it difficult to envision how social reality might "kick back" at the constructs social science seeks to impose upon them and render them problematic. Improvement of our sense of social reality is the only effective means of combating is hypostatization. The clearer a researcher's sense of social reality, the more falsifiable his/her hypotheses can be, the better reality can kick back and shatter hypotheses the researcher seeks to impose on it, and drive research forward.