Nomological explanation and empirical control in the social sciences
pp. 149-179
in: , Cognitive autonomy and methodological individualism, Berlin, Springer, 2015Abstract
Following Dilthey, it has often been argued that, since methodological individualism is inconsistent with the deterministic explanation of action grounded in holistic macro-sociological laws, and since it defends an interpretative approach, it is supportive of a dualistic epistemology (e.g. Boudon 1991). In other words, methodological individualism has been regarded as incompatible with the deductive-nomological model of explanation (which argues that any scientific explanation is based on covering laws) and, in more general terms, with the method of the natural sciences (see Di Nuoscio 2006, pp. 129 ff.; also Little 1990). In my opinion, Hayek, in spite of some lexical ambiguities (see, for example, Hayek 1967, pp. 3–42), does not follow this line of thought. It seems to me that his position is widely compatible with the deductive-nomological model as developed by Popper and Carl G. Hempel which underlines the fundamental unity of the scientific method.