The exclusion argument

Yaron Senderowicz

pp. 19-28

in: Dana Riesenfeld, Giovanni Scarafile (eds), Perspectives on theory of controversies and the ethics of communication, Berlin, Springer, 2014

Abstract

In Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind, I pointed out the epistemic merits of philosophical (metaphysical) controversies by examining a type of argument that is often used in philosophical controversies – the Relevant Controversial Alternative argument. Arguments belonging to this type aim to point out the relevance of the arguer's position to the content of the opponent's radically opposed position. An exchange that consists of Relevant Controversial Alternative arguments and responses to them is a cooperative intellectual project binding the representatives of competing positions together. Exclusion arguments are motivated by the opposite goal. These are arguments that aim to undermine the relevance of a radically opposed position to the content and goals of the position that one supports, that is, they aim to isolate one's position from the opposed one. In this chapter I examine the nature of Exclusion arguments and, in particular, the rational (epistemic) motivation to use them.