Abstract
Dummett's intermediate position on abstract objects combines his early critique of nominalism with his later scepticism concerning the capacity of the context principle to legitimize a robust notion of reference for abstract singular terms. The rationale for Dummett's rejection of a strong interpretation of the context principle as a thesis about reference is set out in his critique of the neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics found in the work of Crispin Wright and Bob Hale.1 According to Dummett, while Wright and Hale are correct to view Frege's context principle as providing a means of overcoming nominalist scruples about our epistemic access to abstract objects, this does not legitimize the attribution of a "full-blown' reference to abstract singular terms. In the current section I critically outline the neo-Fregean position; in doing so I prepare the way for a consideration in the following section of Wright and Hale's critique of Dummett.