Paradox and inconsistency
revising Tennant's distinction through Schroeder-Heister's assumption rules
pp. 111-121
in: Gabriele Lolli, Marco Panza, Giorgio Venturi (eds), From logic to practice, Berlin, Springer, 2015Abstract
In his "Proof and Paradox' (Dialectica 36, 1982), Tennant draws a distinction between paradox and inconsistency. In this paper, two examples are discussed which show Tennant's formulation of the distinction to be problematic. Tennant's distinction is reformulated so to account for these cases as well. This is done by using "A natural extension of natural deduction' (J Symbolic Logic 39:4, 1984) devised by Schroeder-Heister to allow not only formulas but also rules to be assumed in the course of a derivation.