On saying what you really want to say

Wittgenstein, Gödel, and the trisection of the angle

Juliet Floyd

pp. 373-425

in: Jaakko Hintikka (ed), From Dedekind to Gödel, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstract

Wittgenstein's remarks on the first incompleteness theorem¹ have often been denounced, and mostly dismissed. Despite indirect historical evidence to the contrary,² it is a commonplace that Wittgenstein rejected Gödel's proof because he did not, or even could not, understand it.³ Kreisel twice used the word "wild" when he reviewed Wittgenstein on Göde1.⁴ Dummett, in many respects an admirer of Wittgenstein's philosophy, wrote that the remarks on Gödel and on the notion of consistency are "of poor quality or contain definite errors".⁵ Gödel's own comments were damning (see Section III below).

Cited authors

Wittgenstein Ludwig

Gödel Kurt