Categorial representation

pp. 133-147

in: James Mensch, The question of being in Husserl's logical investigations, Berlin, Springer, 1981

Abstract

We may begin by recalling our remark that a purely linguistic ontology is not possible for the Logical Investigations (See above, p. 58). Laws of sense and reference give us the possibilities of positing objects, but actual perceptual presence is needed for us actually to posit being. The focus, then, of Husserl's "Study on Categorial Representation" is the subjective accomplishment of categorial intuition. How does it carry out its task of bringing about an actual perceptual presence? The analogies of truth and being, by which we posit both real and categorial objects, demand certain similarities in the perceptual presence of each. This means that their intuitions must show "a genuine community of essential features." As Husserl also expresses this, in considering the acts directed to categorial or ideal objects, "We call these new acts intuitions because, with the single exception of a "straightforward' relation to the object ..., they have all the essential characteristics of intuition. We shall find in them the same essential divisions, as they also show themselves capable of essentially the same achievements of fulfillment" (LU, Tüb. ed., II/2, 165; F., p. 803).