Introduction

pp. 1-12

in: Burt C. Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, Berlin, Springer, 1993

Abstrakt

The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universally¹ received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"² will, if the conclusions³ reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological ^"superiority" over Husserl.