Phenomenology and henology

Renaud Barbaras

pp. 99-110

in: Erika Abrams, Ivan Chvatík (eds), Jan Patočka and the heritage of phenomenology, Berlin, Springer, 2011

Abstract

In Broken Hegemonies, Rainer Schürmann rereads Neoplatonism while distinguishing between two versions of the ontological difference. One is traced back to a foundation of being: this is the metaphysical difference. The other brings to light the One as the very condition of being: this is the henological difference, but it can also be termed phenomenological, since the One is the transcendental condition of appearing. I propose to show that such is precisely Patočka's position and that his phenomenology is, therefore, a henology. The demonstration includes three stages: (1) the question of Being is to be approached on the basis of the question of appearing: ontology makes sense only as phenomenology; (2) appearing as such cannot be understood if it is referred to something appearing, whatever that may be: the phenomenological difference cannot be a metaphysical difference; and (3) there is a surpassing of beings (of appearance) toward their appearing only as the making evident of their submission to a condition of unity: the phenomenological difference makes sense only as henological difference.

Cited authors

Patočka Jan