Mortality and morality

a Heideggerian interpretation of Kierkegaard's either/or

Megan Altman

pp. 219-237

in: Hans Pedersen, Megan Altman (eds), Horizons of authenticity in phenomenology, existentialism, and moral psychology, Berlin, Springer, 2015

Abstract

In Ian Duckles' Derridian reading of Søren Kierkegaard's Either/Or, Duckles claims that Judge William's defense of ethical life represents an attempt to evade mortality and individual responsibility. His argument is based on the existential interpretation of mortality wherein death is understood as the individuating feature of human existence. The basic idea is that, in the individualization of death, one encounters her identity as an individual who has to stand on her own feet and make something of her life with no support or guarantees that it is the right way to live. According to Duckles, the ethical goal of rational justification for one's actions might be an attempt to avoid responsibility by getting others to share the burden of choosing to make a choice. Is the goal or purpose of ethical existence a disguised attempt to evade mortality and abnegate individual responsibility? In this paper, I follow Charles Guignon's lead and try to show how Heidegger's existential interpretation of death opens up an enriched view of the purpose of ethical existence where the focus is on character formation or self-constitution. After I describe the key features of Heidegger's approach to understanding mortality and morality, I offer a Heideggerian interpretation of Judge William's description of ethical self-transformation. I believe that Kierkegaard uses the pseudonym of Judge William to articulate a secularized form of the ethical that involves a kind of personal transformation wherein one comes to realize one's potential for being a responsible individual.

Cited authors

Heidegger Martin

Kierkegaard Søren

Guignon Charles