Neural representationalism, the hard problem of content and vitiated verdicts

a reply to Hutto & Myin (2013)

Matteo Colombo

pp. 257-274

in: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 13 (2), 2014.

Abstract

Colombo's (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed "the Hard Problem of Content."