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Publication details

Jahr: 2004

Pages: 491-512

Reihe: Synthese

Volle Referenz:

Bradley Armour-Garb, "Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar", Synthese 139 (3), 2004, pp. 491-512.

Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar

Bradley Armour-Garb

pp. 491-512

in: Synthese 139 (3), 2004.

Abstrakt

In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised.

Cited authors

Publication details

Jahr: 2004

Pages: 491-512

Reihe: Synthese

Volle Referenz:

Bradley Armour-Garb, "Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar", Synthese 139 (3), 2004, pp. 491-512.