How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation

some remarks on Schupbach (2009)

Katya Tentori

Vincenzo Crupi

pp. 3-12

in: Jeanne Peijnenburg, Branden Fitelson, Igor Douven (eds), Probability, confirmation and fallacies, Synthese 184 (1), 2012.

Abstract

Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view if properly construed. Finally, we will foster such a claim by means of some novel data.

Cited authors

Schupbach Jonah N.