A receding parallelism

Husserl and Peirce from the perspective of logic of probability

Carlos Lobo

pp. 139-174

in: Mohammad Shafiei, Pietarinen (eds), Peirce and Husserl, Berlin, Springer, 2019

Abstract

The adequate point of view to evaluate if Husserl and Peirce's philosophy are compatible or not, diverging or not, is clearly indicated by Husserl and Peirce themselves: interpreting their apparently common and opposite statements from their respective guiding principles. In order to do so, it is important, first, to list and understand their reciprocal cross-references in order to see if obvious or possible divergences do not rest on bare misunderstandings. Secondly, one should discern common theoretical issues, concepts and methods. It seems that they focus on the setting-up and reform of logic and, in close connection with it, the development of a logic of probability. Lastly those parallel projects must be related their leading principles, which are, respectively, the pragmatic maxim and the paradoxical presupposition-less principle of transcendental phenomenology.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund

Peirce Charles Sanders