
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 1997
Pages: 399-416
Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
ISBN (Hardback): 9789048147748
Full citation:
, "Time and negation", in: Perspectives on time, Berlin, Springer, 1997


Time and negation
pp. 399-416
in: Jan Faye, UWE Scheffler, Max Urchs (eds), Perspectives on time, Berlin, Springer, 1997Abstract
It is not an exaggeration to say that the notion of time is one of the most mysterious. The mysteriousness consists not merely in a vagueness of the notion itself. There are a lot of vague notions, but most of them are at least such that it seems clear within which discipline, science, or branch of knowledge they have to be investigated, i.e. which discipline, science, or branch of knowledge bears the responsibility for the elimination of the vagueness. However, it was repeatedly noted by many researchers that for time the situation is somewhat more intricate. Thus, e.g. G. H. von Wright, defining time as a "fundamental" concept, maintains that it is maybe the best example of a notion which is investigated both by scientists and philosophers. Moreover, he points out that time is simultaneously investigated by several disciplines of natural science (see [15],p. 514–515).
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 1997
Pages: 399-416
Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
ISBN (Hardback): 9789048147748
Full citation:
, "Time and negation", in: Perspectives on time, Berlin, Springer, 1997